

+

1473. c. 15

THE
QUESTION
ON

Some late DISMISSIONS, &c.

[Price ONE SHILLING.]

D[®]
ch
ions

THE
NOTION
OF



Some late Dismissals, &c.

[Price One Guinea.]

THE
QUESTION

ON

Some late DISMISSIONS

TRULY STATED.

By a Friend to the Army and the Constitution.

In answer to

An ADDRESS

TO THE

PUBLIC, &c.

*Multa debortantur à vobis, Quirites, ni studium rei-
publicæ omnia superet: opes factionis; vestra patientia;
jus nullum; ac maxime quod innocentia plus periculi quam
honoris est. SAL.*

LONDON,

Printed for J. WILKIE, in St. Paul's Church-Yard.

MDCCLXIV.

ns
®

THE
QUESTION

OR

Some late Dispositions

TRULY



by J. and to the Author and the Compiler.

Is answer to

AN ADDRESS

TO THE

WORLD OF 1843

This address was delivered at the Anniversary of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, held at Oxford, on the 2nd of September, 1843. It was published by the Association, and is now reprinted for private sale.

LONDON

Printed by J. W. Parker, in St. Paul's Church-yard.

MCCXLIII

THE
CASE
OF AN
OFFICER
Lately dismissed &c.

AMONG the many writings which have of late employed the pens of various partizans, either in attacking or defending the conduct of the present administration, none has appeared to me more worthy of animadversion, than the late address to the public on the dismissal of a general officer.

It seems strange, that in a free country the press should be put under daily restraints, only to punish the advocates for liberty; while its adversaries are allowed to propagate the most arbitrary and slavish tenets without controul. As a friend to that liberty, however, I shall not argue for prosecutions

cutions of any sort ; I had rather hear the wretched authors of such doctrines confuted, than see them punished ; but if the people are to learn their opinions of men and things from public papers, it is essential through what vehicles they are conveyed ; and it is therefore the part of an honest man to prevent such deceptions being imposed upon them, as are at once destructive of private justice and public freedom.

The author of the address sets out by declarations of his own *frankness* and *ingenuity* ; a claim which I cannot totally grant, nor deny him.

Frank he certainly is, as the barefaced avowal of the most abject principles can make him ; but how shall I reconcile to his *ingenuity* his supporting false reasonings by false facts, and depreciating the fair character of an officer by the most pitiful insinuations, and the most palpable misrepresentations of his conduct ?

Is it *ingenuous* to dawb over this act of true min—l despotism by declaring (page 2) it a matter of mere *private concern*, in which neither the army nor the public have scarce the most remote interest ?

Nay, he ingenuously doubts if the officer dismissed has any concern in his own dismissal ! He declares positively (page 35) *it is no injury to him* ; and is rather inclined to think

think it a sort of *favour* done him ! From all which he forms (page 28) the following close chain of reasoning.—It is no injury to the officer himself, therefore it is none to the army ; it is none to the army, therefore it is none to the public !

“ It can be no discouragement to the army, says he, (page 42) that one of its members is cut off from the service, for *a conduct in which their profession is no way concerned in the least.*”

No discouragement to be sure to the army ! A general officer of high rank is dismissed, cashiered ; no crime alledged, no hearing given ; nay professedly for parliamentary conduct ! and we are insolently told, neither the army nor the public have any sort of concern in it !

This is ingenuity with a witness, in one sense of the word. Formerly corruption skulked in holes and corners, and did her shameful work in the dark ; but now she stalks abroad, at noon-day, in her own proper colours, and is preached aloud by the impudent missionaries of faction.

Here is the fairest avowal of the doctrine, principle, and practice too, of despotism and corruption, that has appeared in any age since the glorious days of James the Second.

The author complains bitterly, that an alarm is spread throughout the nation, as if a plan of high prerogative, and true tory discipline, was laid by the faction in power. Can it be wondered, when the very tools and instruments of power are thus the trumpets to proclaim it?

But it is happy for this country, since such a plan is laid, it is laid by such heads, and to be executed by such blunt tools.

This is giving fair warning at least; it is setting up the standard, making open war on the constitution; and it will now be seen whether there are yet left, in this profligate age, resolution and spirit and virtue to resist it.

In the mass of the people I really think there are; they won't knowingly be enslaved; and it is now their own fault if they are. But in the higher ranks of men, I am
3 sorry

sorry to say, that a kind of stupor and lethargic indifference to all great principles, moral and political, seem to reign with a more unbounded dominion, than in any age or time I have read of; except, perhaps, the last stages in the decline of the Roman and Athenian states, or the profligate reign of our own Charles the Second.

It is an age of sordid, mean habits; where there appears little more spirit in our vices, than our virtues. An effeminate luxury, a childish passion for equipage and shew, and a womanish habit of fauntering away our time in a round of card assemblies, and silly gossiping societies, absorb and possess us; while the manly sense and manly virtue, the patriot warmth, and noble public spirit of our ancestors, give way to a set of low views and ideas, centering in the private interest of each individual.

Were it otherwise, the min—s and their tools would indeed have reason to complain of alarms, and to feel them too. The friends of liberty have now reason to complain of the supineness and indifference with which we see this badge of slavery openly attempted to be fixed on the most useful and honourable profession; on those whose spirit, rising above
the

the low effeminacy of the times, has just exalted this country to the highest pitch of consideration and power it perhaps ever yet possessed among the states of Europe. So exactly true of this age is that which Florus says of the Augustan: *Ut claritate rerum bellicarum magnifici, ita cladibus domesticis miseri & erubescendi.*

That I may not however be reproached with having overcharged the picture of this author's sentiments, or drawn from them one unfair deduction, I will follow his arguments a little more methodically under the three heads he himself has ranged them; of the real or supposed injury done to the officer himself; to the army; and to the public.

I will not cavil at words, nor dwell upon the contradictions he runs into, in first assigning the reason of the general's dismissal circumstantially, and positively; then saying, (page 26 and 27) *he will assign no reason*; and then again (page 29) positively determining it was *for a conduct in which his profession was no way* (page 42) *concerned in the least.*—Or his complaining heavily of the cruelty and injustice of charging the ministry with a plan laid down to garble the army, by turning out officers who dare

dare to differ with them in p——t; and then himself so avowedly establishing the fact, and supporting the principle of it. I will not dwell upon these inaccuracies, knowing the difficulty a man must be under, who, in an address to the free-people of Great-Britain, undertakes the defence of doctrines and practices subversive of all freedom; but will endeavour to state his arguments fairly, and to answer them with candour and clearness if I can.

The author then lays down, (page 35) that this gentleman's dismissal was *no injury* to him at all *as a private citizen*.

First, because he foresaw it, and *therefore*, to be sure, *chose it*; *volenti non fit injuria*, says he, (page 42.)

Next, because though it was a severe punishment, it was no more than proportioned to the heinousness of *his guilt, in the part he took last session in parliament*.

Thirdly, because not being in the author's opinion an officer of any merit or ability, there was no reason to spare him. And lastly, because having *served a great number of years, it was now no hardship to dismiss him*, the amount of his pay during that time being at a fair estimation the full value of his services.

As to his foreseeing his dismissal, if he did foresee that it would be the consequence of the conduct he was likely to hold in parliament,

liament, it argued two things; viz. That he had formed a right opinion of the arbitrary and corrupt principles of the present m—y, and that he had firmness and courage to resist them.

But because he *foresaw*, why was it *volenti*? By what logic does it follow that he approved, or chose his dismissal, any more than any man may be said to approve an evil, which he cannot avoid but by a greater? If a tyrant orders me to do a base or barbarous act, and threatens me with punishment if I disobey; though I foresee the consequence of my refusal, it is probable I approve the punishment no more than the act by which I might have avoided it. At the time of the famous massacre of the Hugonots in France, Charles IX. gave orders to the Count de Tende, among others, to execute a part of that bloody plan on the Hugonots under his government; but that gallant officer answered: "He was the king's faithful soldier, but not his executioner."

If he *foresaw* that his honest and virtuous disobedience was to cost him his life, as it did, it enhanced his merit, but was it therefore no injury?

It is said the general in question was, previous to the session of parliament, or during it, closetted by some of the m—rs; but what menaces he might have then heard,
or

or what *orders* he might receive from them, it is pity I cannot positively tell, as it would in some measure have cleared up this point of his foreknowledge of the disaster that was to attend him. I shall only say, that if they were of a kind he thought inconsistent with his honour and conscience to obey, and incompatible with the freedom and interest of his country, whatever they may think who hold for the infallibility of min—rs, the world will probably judge he did honestly and honourably in despising them.

As to the second point, viz. that atrocious guilt of his refractory and disobedient conduct in parliament, by which he deserved this *totality of punishment* (page 27); will the author forgive my saying, that in order to colour with some kind of plausibility the dangerous doctrine of military punishments for parl—tary conduct, he has arbitrarily assigned plans and motives to that gentleman not having the least foundation in fact, and then totally varied and misrepresented facts, to make them square with that hypothesis, lame in its very foundation.

For instance, General C—y is charged in different parts of this work (page 31) with a *regular plan of opposition* to what is called *the king's measures*, (namely those of the ministers) “ *with taking no part in re-*
“ sending the insult which had been so grossly
C “ offered

“ offered to his Majesty ; with an obstinate resolution to persecute the amiable virtues of his royal master ; with braving him in his very bed-chamber ; harassing and perplexing his servants from disgust, caprice, ambition, or some such motive.” And lastly, to complete the charge in the same spirit of truth, with frequenting Wildman’s, where I will take upon me to assert he never once appeared.

This the author calls (page 32) *fairly stating his conduct to the public*. But who, acquainted with the proceedings of parliament, does not in this *fair representation* rather see the picture of a Gracchus, a Massanello, or the fiery spirit of some of our late tribunes of the people (now pillars of prerogative in the present a——n) than the cool and moderate behaviour of the gentleman in question ?

If *his* had been an uniform system of opposition to the ministers, as the author pretends, is he at liberty to assign such grounds for it ? Is regular opposition to ministers so very much more dishonest, than regular defence of them, that no one good motive can be assigned ? Or if so, what becomes of the virtue of our present upright ministry, who past several years of their lives in the most *determined, uniform, and violent* opposition to government ? But what if this is all

all a mere creature of the author's own fertile invention, in what light will this accurate, humane and *ingenuous* person then stand before that public to whom he appeals?

I will endeavour then to state upon my best recollection, rather more *fairly* than our author, what was really General C—y's conduct during the last session, the only one he has appeared in under the reign of our present King and administration, having attended his military service abroad during the whole of the two preceding winters.

But even that period of this *uniform and regular opposition* the author himself assists me in shortening; for he tells us (page 31) *that before Christmas General C—y had observed a kind of suspicious neutrality*; but after Christmas indeed for *one whole entire month*, viz. *between the 16th of January and the 17th of the following month*, (such is the accuracy of our author) during that vast period General C—y *never happened to be of the same opinion with the King's servants in government*; except in some one point in which Mr. Wilkes was concerned, the particulars of which are by no means present to his recollection.—The above are the author's own words, and contain, in point of fact, the whole heavy charge against this *gentleman*; in which please to observe the exact candour

with which things are stated. When General C——y did not take a part at all, it was a *suspicious neutrality*; when he did not concur (*except in one instance*) during a month, it was an *uniform plan of opposition*; and when he did concur, the *particulars are not present to the author's candid recollection*. Now in this month, during which we are told General C——y gave *but one vote* with the court party, may I ask how many more opportunities of voting might occur? *Two?* or *three?* Do I not name the utmost? In those two or three occasions, did any mark of disaffection, disloyalty or disrespect to his royal master appear? If he spoke with freedom, or even warmth, on the subject he treated (which was certainly an important one) did he depart from the decency and candour due to persons, or the decorum owing to the place he spoke in? I can venture positively to say he did not; and I can venture farther to assert, in answer to the author's invidious misrepresentation even of *his silence*, that the fact is not true; and that I heard him express in parliament, on several occasions, the highest honour, respect and duty towards his Majesty; and the strongest detestation of the personal insult offered him.

To be still more distinct, I will to the best of *my* recollection take upon me to affirm, that General C——y, during the whole of

the last session of parliament, never gave a single vote against the administration (be the merit what it may) except in those questions that related to the famous warrants and imprisonment of Mr. Wilkes, (as interesting questions to public liberty as ever came before parliament.)

That even on that subject he did not oppose the censures past on that gentleman and his writings; and that on the supposed assassination affair (perhaps that which the author chose to forget) he took a part warmly, to prevent any alarm from being spread that might affect government on so false and unfair a foundation.

If these facts are true (and if not, let the author disprove them if he can by facts, not by arbitrary censure and declamation) where then is this vision of *settled systems of opposition* and leagues to distress and harass government? Or where this impious resolution *to lay aside all duty and affection to his royal master; to persecute his amiable virtues, even with obstinacy, and insolently to brave him in his very bed-chamber?* Where, but in the warped and crooked imaginations, or rather, I doubt, in the slanderous mouths of those who do the servile task assigned them, at the expence of truth, decency, and humanity; and without consideration of any duty they owe to God or man?

If

If such therefore are the representations of this general's conduct by the creatures of the min—rs, how consonant to them may we not naturally suppose their own whispers in the sacred ear of M——y, by which he has lost his sovereign's favour, had his fame basely attempted, and his fortune deeply injured? And how peculiarly does the candour of these dark advisers shine, if it be true, as the world says, that some of them previously flattered this gentleman with encomiums, and tempted him with high offers, *if he would follow them!* How like the dæmon himself is the conduct of men who ruin those they have not power to seduce!

One thing more I should not omit on this head, as the author lays, very judiciously, much stress upon it, viz. if General C——y acted so conscientiously in the great questions on the warrants; “why, says he, did he
“not take the same distinguished part for
“the bill which was to regulate the abuse
“complained of for the future? When
“that is answered, the true motives for his
“conduct may appear.”

The answer is short, and I think plain. Such a bill was indeed proposed one day in a thin house; I am pretty sure the general was not even present; it was treated as an absurd proposition by both parties, and rejected without a division, and as I remember almost
without

without a debate. But if the author means to insinuate that this was a proper way to regulate that abuse, let me ask *him* a question; and if it is answered, *the motives of other people may appear*. Pray why was that bill rejected? the min—try certainly could carry it; *why did they not?*

I will tell him then why both parties agreed in rejecting it: those who wished the continuance of the abuse, and relished the power of arbitrary imprisonments, were against any restraint of it; the rest of the house in general saw the absurdity of the proposition: the warrants were universally allowed to be illegal: the most profligate lawyer in the H. could not say the contrary; they were contrary to *magna charta* and the bill of rights; and every body saw that, by *relnacting*, we should weaken those great pillars of our liberty. We did not want a new law, but the due execution of the old. The m——y had signally infringed them; they supported that infringement by the vicious practice of others; and it therefore became as necessary, as it was truly constitutional, to correct that abuse by parliamentary animadversion.

I now come under the third head of this argument, to consider whether the military character of this gentleman has not been treated with the same measure of justice and candour

candour as his civil ; and whether his services and character as an officer were not such as might at least have protected him from a treatment so full of rigour and indignity.

The author allows him to have a *spirited courage* ; and though he should be as thoroughly wanting in the other qualifications of knowledge and ability as the author seems to pronounce him, yet would his dismissal, under the circumstances I have mentioned above, be full of hardship and oppression, nor defensible by any one rule of justice, civil or military.

I do not intend to enter deeply into a discussion of military conduct and capacity, which I am not equal to.

I shall therefore only give, in the author's own words, his representation of this gentleman's services ; the candour and truth of which are too striking to want much comment ; and oppose to them a short observation or two, with a few general facts, as I have heard them, from the mouths of officers.

“ The great view, says our author, in
 “ which the army can suffer as a profession,
 “ is in the male disposition of its ranks and
 “ very lucrative employments ; if these are
 “ confined to *borough connexions*, instead of
 “ being the rewards of *ability* and *service*,
 “ it will cease to be a school of great and
 “ glorious achievements, and will become
 “ a

" a repository for those who have neither
 " knowledge nor experience enough to do credit
 " to themselves, or service to the public. Try
 " the subject of the present question by what
 " has been above-mentioned. What are likely
 " to be the sentiments of the officers of the
 " army on the dismissal of this general?"
 This is sure the plain description of some
 tame voting officer, who had never seen a
 day's service, but meanly raised himself by
 that corruption which the min—rs now
 preach and practise, and which General
 C——y has shewn he despises.

Who then can discover in it the smallest
 feature of one who after twenty-six or seven
 years service, with fidelity and bravery (ac-
 knowledged even by our author) after, I be-
 lieve, nine or ten campaigns against the
 enemy in the field, and being in six or seven
 battles, in several of which he is said to have
 remarkably distinguished himself, besides a va-
 riety of other services, at the end of this period
 found himself at the head of a regiment of
 dragoons, (his only military emolument)
 worth on the present establishment, as I am
 informed, about 12 or 1300 l. per annum?

I believe I don't exaggerate any part of
 this account; I apprehend that general has
 served from his earliest youth in the manner
 I have mentioned; was at the battles of
 Dettingen, Fontenoy, Culloden, Laffeldt,
 D Philling-

Phillinghausen and Willemsdahl, with the highest approbation of two of the greatest and bravest princes in Europe, under whom he served, the duke of Cumberland and prince Ferdinand. I have heard his *conduct*; though not approved by our more knowing author, was esteemed by his R. H. in the former, and not less by prince Ferdinand in the late war, who did not shew greater confidence in any general of *his rank*, English or foreign; both by the considerable commands he gave him, and the approbation he expressed in his conduct of them during the two last campaigns; and to the last day of them, when he was intrusted with a separate command of the greatest importance, and inferior, as I am told, to that of the marquiss of Granby only.

This is in general what I have heard of this gentleman's services; but our author, who seems to hear with the same impartiality he speaks, has heard of him only *at Rochefort*. The indulgent public he tells us has drawn a veil over that affair, *because the general is in opposition*. They must then have foretold this opposition a long while, for I think that expedition happened seven years ago. But if the public were so indulgent as to draw a veil over it, our indulgent, candid author has at least turned up a little corner, and is willing it should not be quite buried

buried in oblivion ! God knows I don't intend to enter into dispute on that old beaten topic ; and shall only say, that instead of veils and indulgence, no subject was ever more discussed, nor were the public ever less in a humour to be *indulgent* ; that affair happening after the condemnation of admiral Byng, the losses in the Mediterranean, &c. when the temper of the people was thoroughly soured, and when, I believe, marshal Turenne, or the great duke of Marlborough, would have been reckoned cowards for not attacking, though certain destruction to the troops, or the disgrace of another St. Cas were to follow. General C——y, however, was there only in a subordinate situation ; the conduct of the principal, a man of undoubted spirit and excellent character, was found unworthy of the smallest censure by thirteen officers of rank and distinction ; and if a *veil* was drawn, I believe it was rather over some parts of that history that might have been advantageous to the subject of our discussion, in respect to his propositions for landing, &c.

But enough of Rochefort.—The author's malice cannot, I believe, find out a topic of defamation that will make less impression.

Yet as a farther plea for his patrons, he tells us that General C——y, though brave, had not rendered his country the same important services as General Wolfe, or Sir

Jeffery Amherst, &c. it is very possible, yet the conclusion, *that therefore it was just to cashier him*, seems rather a forced one: men may be very brave, useful and meritorious officers, and have neither opportunity nor perhaps ability to shine in the very foremost rank; but if they have not been heroes like Wolfe, or conquerors of provinces like Amherst, does it therefore follow that they are to starve? Or that their fortune, fame and favour with their King, after a whole life dedicated to the service, are to be the sport of every corrupt m——r of state for a vote in parliament?

If the merits of other officers are greater, has not also their advancement followed it? If Mostyn and Waldegrave are both abler officers, or have distinguished themselves more, as the author says, have not their appointments also been greater? And as far as m——l offers go, might not this unmeritorious, discarded officer have had the same expectations, had he promised the same parliamentary dispositions which they have shewn, I doubt not, with the strictest sincerity and honour?

His only military appointments were then what I stated above, a regiment of dragoons, the gift of his Majesty five or six years ago: if he had any farther emolument in the army, it was only his pay on the staff while he was employed, particularly in Germany; where

where it is probable he did not much improve his fortune; it being notorious, that while agents, paymasters and contractors were gaining immense fortunes at their ease, his Majesty's generals were impairing theirs in a course of danger and fatigue.

But observe this calculator of military merit by pounds, shillings and pence: "His appointments have been very considerable for a great length of time, says he, to which if we add the large increase which he derived from being left commander in chief in Germany, they would form a sum to out-balance the deservings of many military men." The article of the command in chief is curious; it lasted three or four months; that increase might therefore amount to six or seven hundred pounds, I imagine; and if the increased expence of living as commander in chief in the dearest country in Europe, and other attendant charges on that situation be set down, he was probably not a farthing the richer for this stupendous emolument.

It is indeed true, and cannot be denied, that he has enjoyed a regiment of foot many years, having been at the head of one at the battle of Laffeldt, where he was taken prisoner, seventeen years ago; but how full of equity and justice is this inverse rule of military arithmetic, by which the longer an officer

officer has held a commission, the less right he has to it. He has enjoyed it *for a great length of time*; therefore it is fit now to balance accounts, and to dismiss him! What proper encouragement is here for good well-disciplined *young* officers, who know how to behave in parliament; and what a proper disregard to the state, and vulgar pretensions of useless, crusty veterans? Our military memorials will now be penned in a very different stile from what has hitherto been the mistaken rule; and instead of setting forth their services in the field, the battles they have fought, the campaigns they have made, or the *great length of time* they have held their respective commissions, I imagine a general's memorial will hereafter run in the following form.

“ The humble memorial of General A.
 “ B. C. sheweth: That your memorialist
 “ has served your M——y only five years,
 “ generally at home; has enjoyed the regi-
 “ ment your M——y last gave him the
 “ command of but two years; has attended
 “ parliament constantly, and never gave a
 “ single vote against the opinion and direc-
 “ tions of your M——y's wife and incorrupt
 “ ministers, nor never will; and therefore
 “ hopes your M——y will honour him with
 “ the command of a regiment of dragoons;
 “ or give him some good lucrative govern-
 “ ment,

"ment, as your M— in your known wisdom and justice shall think fit, &c. &c."

It is thus then the author makes up the account of the dismissed general and his services; it is thus that (arguing ill from his own wrong premises, and weighing false facts in uneven scales) he stands, as he terms it, *middle-man* between him and the public; much such a middle-man, it is probable, as some of the m—rs have stood between the same general and the K—g; to mistake his character and conduct, to misrepresent, to depreciate, to injure and to defame.

How hard is the lot of princes who are excluded from the general commerce of mankind, and who hear and see and know, and take their impressions of men and things commonly through the false medium of the most depraved and interested opinions.

"Colligunt se quatuor aut quinque, said Aurelius, atque unum concilium ad decipiendum imperatorem capiunt. Imperator qui domi clausus est vera non novit; cogitur hoc tantum scire quod illi loquantur: facit iudices quos fieri non oportet; amovet à republica quos debebat retinere."

From hence are the most excellent dispositions of monarchs often totally prevented, their favours squandered upon the most worthless minions of minions, and their indignation

dignation turned against their most faithful and affectionate subjects.

Hence did Alexander at the suggestion of a wretched eunuch kill the bravest and best of his friends. Hence was Octavius hurried into those cruelties that tarnished the glories of his reign.

"Optima enim videtur in eo esse indoles"
 " (says Cicero of him) *sed flexibilis ætas*
" multique ad depravandum parati."

This is the common fate of princes, but more particularly of those who have implicitly resigned themselves into the hands of imperious favourites; history is full of such examples generally unhappy, often so melancholy, as should deter them from the same fatal weakness.

With what promising omens for his people did the dawn of his present M—'s auspicious reign open? Bright with the highest lustre of honour and conquest, yet in nothing more conspicuous than those amiable dispositions in the sovereign, that love of justice and equity, and that regard for the liberties and constitution, which endear him to the hearts of his free subjects. The army too, who had merited his regard by their recent services, had a large share in his affections.

When he was told of a worthy officer, Sir H. Erskine, who had lost his commission for a few votes in parliament, he not only
 imme-

immediately restored him to his lost rank, but even advanced him; with the most gracious expressions of his good-will, telling him, it was not *from motives of favour, but of justice he was thus rewarded.* Such were the genuine, generous sentiments of our beloved monarch; and such his regard for the independency of parliament and freedom of this happy constitution.—He knew, that to reign happily he must fix his throne in the willing-hearts of his people; and he knew, that those royal and truly patriot sentiments he felt are the only pillars on which it could be so established.—He remembered, that when King William was advised to dismiss Sir George Rooke, a brave and able officer, for opposition to his ministers, he rejected the proposal with indignation; and said, *he would never dismiss a brave officer for his conduct in parliament.*

The reign and example of that great prince were chosen as the worthy objects of his imitation; he knew that was the period of our second *magna charta*; the auspicious æra of our deliverance from tyranny and lawless power; and that an adherence to the principles and practice of our great deliverer could not fail to endear him to his grateful people. Even in that time however there were not wanting ministers to deceive, and sycophants to defame. Those who advised Rooke's dis-

missi-

E

mission,

mission, seconded the first injury they had done him by a worse, and blackened his reputation, from a vain hope to save their own: this was the man they said *who gave his opinion against landing at Cadiz.*

They forgot his behaviour at Beachy-head, at La Hogue and St. Llagas, *and had heard of him only at Cadiz*, because a little unpopularity attended that service, yet the world saw through this thin disguise.

“Proprium humani ingenii est odisse quem deseris.” — They knew how much it was in human nature to persecute those you have injured, and that it was the way of men, of ministers especially, rather to commit two faults than to retract one.

King William then thought his ministers were subject to error like other men; he saw no infallibility in them, and consequently no crime in opposing them. — The godlike Trajan's sentiments were still more enlarged: he allowed the doctrine of resistance even to himself, if he deserved it; and when he presented a sword to Sura, a brave veteran of his army, he said these noble patriot words:

“Pro me, si merear in me.” — His blood and his life were offered to his grateful people.

It is by such sentiments and such behaviour princes make themselves adored by their people; if therefore there are any
amongst

amongst us at work, however vainly, to destroy them, and to substitute in their room a set of little narrow principles equally unworthy of royalty and humanity, sacrificing the honour and happiness of their sovereign to the groveling views of their own mean ambition, in what detestation should they be held both by prince and people, whose peace and welfare are equally at stake? And can you doubt that it is so, when such oppressions are tolerated, and such doctrines openly propagated?

The propositions of the author before us leave, I think, very little doubt on this head: with what wanton insolence does he sport with the idea of ruining officers that are refractory in parliament, and starving them into compliance! Talking of *dismissals*, he says (page 8 and 9) "Our state physicians
 " indeed have considered them as a kind of
 " extraordinary remedy, only to be pre-
 " scribed when every other method of treat-
 " ment has been found ineffectual. There
 " is one singular property attending them,
 " that as they are very violent in their opera-
 " tion, and consequently often annihilate the
 " patient they are given to, who is unable to
 " bear them; yet they are found to act col-
 " laterally, and produce the most surprising
 " effects on persons in the same disorder,
 " having been known to recover men who

“ were very near the last stage of the dis-
 “ temper. The first salutary symptom is a
 “ Πενή Φοβία, for fear of starving, &c.”—I
 do our author no wrong in point of sense,
 sentiment, or grammar, because I quote his
 identical words; which will scarce be believed
 by those who do not particularly recollect,
 or have not his ingenious and prudent work
 before them. It was a little unfair in him to
 be so learned, and to talk Greek in a case
 in which our officers are so much concern-
 ed, who are not obliged to understand it;
 there is enough however in *plain English*
 for them to see what they are to expect.

Some may have escaped this session, but
 let them beware of the next.

Perituros audio multos!

Nil dubium; magna est fornacula.

There is a monstrous furnace prepared for
 those that dare be disobedient: the min—ry
 speak out upon it as I am told, “ Well,
 “ now General C——y is dismissed, we shall
 “ see whether the other officers will *dare* to
 “ continue in opposition next winter.”

It is then the system established, and it
 would be paying a bad compliment to the
 consistency and *spirit* of the min—ry not to
 suppose they will go through with it; the
 author himself says (page 22) it would be
 cowardice

cowardice and pusillanimity in them to proceed upon any other principle. There was a necessity (page 27) also for its *totality to make it a punishment*, a proper punishment for this enormous crime of parliamentary disobedience! "The removal from the bed-chamber alone (says he, page 29) could not surely be considered as the whole of the displeasure that was to arise, as long as there remained a *possibility of inflicting more!*"

What luck for this nation the axe and bow-string are not parts of English prerogative, when we have such advisers, and such a noble spirited prerogative ministry to support it?

I come now to consider how far the army have reason to look upon themselves as concerned in this dismissal, which I think is reducible to a very short question, Do they chuse to be slaves or freemen? Do they chuse honour and dignity for their profession, and that fair liberty that is the birthright of every Briton, and the grace of every thing that is noble amongst us; or to be the low and mercenary tools of power, living in a base and pitiful dependence on ministers? I speak of such as are of rank and weight to aspire to seats in our senate; for I do agree with the author of the address, it is not the actual value of the individual in question to
the

the army or to the public, his loss may be supplied; the army abounds in brave officers, and no doubt in able ones.

It is a much greater question than his particular loss we agitate: were his consideration five times greater, it would be lost in the magnitude of this public question; and were it five times less, the honour of the army would be equally interested in the decision of it. — It is the manner of the dismissal, it is the avowed cause of it, the profligate doctrines preached to support it, and the servile and mortifying compliance with which officers in parliament are called upon to give up their conduct, consciences, and opinions, into the hands of ministers.

The author falsely says it is sanctified by custom; — by constant custom. I deny equally that any custom can sanctify a practice so unconstitutional; and that this of turning out officers for their conduct in parliament, has the pretence even of a bad custom to support it. — Let it be considered that General Cady is already the fourth officer dismissed for parliamentary behaviour since the beginning of the last session of parliament; and I believe I may then say, that scarce more instances of the same occur since the last Stuart sat on the throne;

The earl of Shelborne, colonel Barry both officers of bravery and distinction, and

General

General Account, after thirty years unexceptionable service. If General O——y's private fortune puts him above a state of actual distress, as the author tells us, could he say the same of General Account? And has not that worthy officer been cruelly turned adrift in the decline of life, himself and family scarce having the most moderate means to support them? (Here was a proper object to exercise the author's humane talent of ridicule!)

He voted decently and conscientiously; nor could I ever learn any crime even the ministry could farther lay to his charge, except that of remonstrating for the sake of the army against an unlawful pretension and practice of the present Ministry at war, in regard to the discharging of soldiers by his own authority.

It now appears then pretty clearly by what tenure military officers in parliament are understood to hold their commissions; and in what channel favour is to flow to them. "He should have given his assistance to government," (says the author, page 20) if he expected their support." And again, "As he went out of his way, and of his profession, to perplex and harass the servants whom the King thought proper to employ," (viz. by opposing their measures on one great and important point of public liberty!) "it

" is

“ is no wonder, that in some sort retaliation
 “ should take place!”

That I think is speaking pretty plain : but if the doctrine itself seems harsh and cruel, the arguments on which it is founded, and the manner in which it is treated, are still more insolent and mortifying to officers ; their profession is undervalued and rated even below the degree of those civil employments, most of which are in the dependent train of all ministries by turns, and make as it were a part of their trappings and paraphernalia.

“ With this difference, says he, in favour
 “ of the *civil officer*, in proportion as situa-
 “ tions acquired by dint of industry are
 “ more pleasant to enjoy, more difficult
 “ to be obtained, and consequently more
 “ grievous to lose, than those great and sud-
 “ den elevations which are the *coup de mains*
 “ of fortune.” If General C—y’s was a
coup de main of fortune, it was, as a noble
 lord said upon another occasion, certainly *the*
longest coup de main one ever heard of ; that
 general having served about two-and-twenty
 years when he got the regiment now taken
 from him ; and I think the *coup de pied* by
 which he has lost his regiment may be
 judged, by all impartial men, full as extra-
 ordinary as any *coup de main* by which he
 can be said to have got it.

I shall

I shall not waste my time and the reader's so much as to discuss the comparative pretensions of civil and military employments; if the author had made nine or ten campaigns, perhaps he might have thought his own civil employment, if he has one, as he probably has or soon will, not so much *more difficult to obtain* than a regiment of dragoons, so obtained, though he might still think it *more pleasant to enjoy*.

If any thing farther could be wanting to complete the abject state of dependence to which military members of parliament are to be reduced (if they permit it) it is contained in the following and other paragraphs of *the Address*, where, after shewing they are to be slaves, he treats them as fools; telling them in plain terms, that they have no business *to have an opinion* in parliamentary questions; it is out of their way, it is foreign to their profession, &c. "When officers incur the displeasure of their master for matters *wholly foreign to their profession*, they will be so far from making *cause commune*, that it will be a means of keeping them more closely attached to their respective business before them, as the surest way to preserve a connexion between their merits and their advancement, &c." (page 23.)

The *respective businesses* before officers who are in parliament, during their attendance there, one should naturally think were to weigh, and to give their opinions upon such matters as come before the house; but as it is impossible that in doing that honestly and freely, they should really give offence to his M——y, the *master* here meant I understand to be *the minister*, and then the whole is very clear and consonant to the doctrine preached throughout.

Members of parliament, nay parliaments themselves, have been told in former arbitrary times, *They were not to meddle in matters of state; which were above them!* That language is now revived for one part of the parliament; the military officers there; *ne futor ultra crepidam*; mind your own business. If questions come before you, in which the ministry are concerned, don't presume to think "your-
 " selves judges of them; *but if you expect*
 " *their support, give them your assistance*, it
 " is the surest means of preserving a con-
 " nexion between *your merits* and your ad-
 " vancement!" But above all don't dare to talk of making *cause commune*; nor think it any injury to your profession that General C——y has lost his regiment for presuming to have an opinion on the imprisonment of a British subject, and that three more officers

have suffered the same fate last winter for the same cause; but rather take warning by their bad example; be submissive; be respectful to ministers, and have no opinion but theirs; or go talk of your accoutrements, swords, and shoe-buckles, “ ’Tis safer, and “ suits your understanding better.”

How far British officers and British members of parliament will relish such doctrine, must be left to their own breasts to determine. The m——s in the mean time are certainly in the right to preach down all spirit of resentment on such palpable insults offered to the whole profession.—No sound more dreadful in their ears than that of *Cause commune!* *Divide & impera* is their device.

To dissolve all bands of society, all ties of mutual obligation among men, and to stifle all sense of honour, and all spirit of just resentment, is the business of those who mean to govern by a system of slavery and corruption; they look upon men of virtue as their natural enemies, and endeavour to render them mean, base, and unfaithful to each other, that they may not have strength to break the yoke imposed upon them, nor dare to trust one another in any fair and generous design for the support of their common liberty and honour. If proof could be wanting that this is the system of the times, read

it in the very express words of another writer on the like noble principles; where speaking on the same occasion of General C——y's dismissal, he says:

“ In this case it happens that the very virtues of the officer increase his own and his Sovereign's difficulties; for the more honour and conscience he has, he is the less qualified to keep his commission.” Vide *Question of the independency of military officers serving in parliament*, page 55. Writers on political subjects are suspected, and generally with reason, of mistaking the words and sentiments of their antagonists; the reader who has the curiosity may satisfy himself of the accuracy with which I have quoted the above, and will agree, I believe, that none in the English language could more distinctly express the sentiments, principles and designs, I have ascribed to those who have advised or justified the late dismissal.—The officers of the army will judge how far it becomes them to acquiesce in the public avowal of a system by which their *honour and conscience* are not only made *obstacles to their advancement*, but *disqualifications from holding their commissions*. If then these inferences are true, and they are so even beyond a possibility of contradiction, it is plain, that the army are not only concerned, but immediately, intimately

ly and deeply concerned in the late dimission.

They must either make a self-denying ordinance for themselves, and abandon the hopes and advantage of coming into parliament, or they must abandon their profession, or they must resolve to act in concurrence with all ministers, at all times, and on all occasions.

This is not vague declamation, but actual demonstration founded on fact and plain avowed principles; General Accourt, at the end of thirty years service, General C——y at the end of twenty-seven, have professedly been dismissed for their p———ry conduct; the present m———y act on open principles, and are not *so pusillanimous* as to deny it! What hopes therefore can officers have, but that after dedicating themselves to the military profession; after risking their lives in the service of their country abroad, they must return to risque their fortunes with equal hazard at home; unless they resign their understanding and conscience into the hands of the minister *de facto*, be he who he may. Some may call this prudence; I call it slavery; some may pretend it is due to the K—g; it is a mockery and an abuse of the understandings of men; since every child knows, that the measures discussed in parliament

ment are the measures of the ministry, not of the King. It is plain to common sense; it is the fundamental rule of our government; wherefore to substitute the sacred name of Majesty, and to make him a party in order to screen corrupt and peevish ministers, or draw down his royal displeasure on more honest and truly dutiful subjects than themselves, is base and dishonourable, as it is contrary to the first principles of our constitution.

I come now in the last place to consider what injury the public may properly be said to have received by the dismissal of this officer.

That they are injured by it is already proved, if what I have advanced above has any foundation; and that without having recourse to any supposed consideration, or peculiar merit in the person. "In as much as you have done it to one of these little ones, you have done it to me," says that which is above all human authorities. The cause of the smallest individual oppressed by the hand of power, is the cause of the public. If virtue and merit are the objects of that oppression, it is doubly so; and how much more still, if an honest zeal for the laws and liberty of this nation have been the avowed source of that oppression!

To

To shew how the public is concerned in open and avowed attempts to influence members, and to destroy the independency of parliament, is either a very narrow, or a very large field. To prove it by argument, is holding up a candle to shew the sun shines at noon; but to paint this monstrous evil in its proper colours, with all the train of fatal and disastrous consequences that attend it, is a task too large for the narrow bounds I have now prescribed myself. I shall therefore, in following the arguments of our author, only touch upon them for the reasons I have given above; not to prove what stands already proved, but as far as my weak voice can reach to alarm the incautious, to rouse the inactive, and to awaken the supine and inattentive, by retracing in their memory some of those ideas and interests, which were the governing spirit and principle of our ancestors; but which the arts of designing men, the general growth of luxury and corruption, and the gradual decay of public spirit, seem to have in a manner obliterated.

The author calls upon us pathetically to have *confidence* in our governors; but does he not in the same breath destroy that confidence he wishes to enforce? I thought that confidence in ministers was to grow from their uprightness, their disinterestedness, their
hu-

humanity, their contempt of the foul arts of corruption, their love of justice, and their regard for the liberties, laws, and constitution of their country. Does it then consist with acts of violence and injustice, with arbitrary punishments, with inhumanly wantoning in the ruin of men who dare even modestly to appear in the cause of their country; and in avowed attempts to set at nought that most sacred palladium of our liberty, the independency of parliament? If so, then had Buckingham, Strafford, Clifford, Arlington, a better right to the confidence of the people, than Burleigh, Clarendon, Southampton, or Pitt!

To have the confidence of the people, ministers must deign to deserve it. For our foolish people of England are, as the author says, of that troublesome *latitudinarian* kind of spirit, that they will think and feel for themselves, in spite of all ministers and their creatures can do to prevent it. I do agree with him, that it is a very impertinent vexatious quality in them; and that ministers would do their business with ten times the ease and pleasure they do, if they could break them of it; especially that indecent practice of scrutinizing *and often condemning the actions of their superiors*; an intemperance *which*, as he rightly observes, *ought to be reckoned*

reckoned the reproach of a civilized people! Does not the author think in his conscience, if that and two more detestable habits we have could be corrected, his patrons might live perfectly at their ease, and all their creatures in affluence and pleasure? The only objects really worth attention?

I mean that impertinent custom of writing with freedom on all subjects; on subjects of government especially, which is vulgarly called *the liberty of the press*; and that other very insolent and sometimes even *perplexing* liberty which officers of the army and others have lately taken of thwarting and opposing some min—st—r measures in parliament!

We see how almost every step of our present wise and considerate ad—str—n tends to the destruction of these evils, and who knows but they may at last succeed? The several prosecutions against libellers; the taking up a member of parliament without even the troublesome formality of an oath; and committing him close prisoner to the Tower; and breaking open his house and seizing all his papers; with the convenient use of general dormant warrants, &c. &c. The sanction given to these proceedings by the p—t's determination, not to declare them illegal; the breaking four or five officers professedly for not concurring in that determination; all these, and many more,

G

are

are symptoms of great amendment: add that lukewarmness and indifference I have mentioned above; which just allow us to see, scarce to feel, the indignities put upon us; and add the many pretty new modes of thinking imported daily from France and other more courtly governments, and perhaps we need not despair of being as *civilized* as France herself, and forgetting those ruffian and unpolished manners that are so troublesome to the author and his friends.

I rather think we shall exceed them; for in France they seem to be taking up the spirit we are in such haste to lay down: hear the language of their parliaments; see their late remonstrances, containing such things as would send an English minister of p———t *close prisoner to the Tower!*—The parliament of Paris in their remonstrance of the 18th of June 1763, speaking of an edict of the king, say:

Que les instigateurs de l'acte de pouvoir absolu, executé le 31 Mai dernier, ont compromis l'autorité du dit seigneur roi avec la constitution la plus essentielle & la plus sacrée de la monarchie."

" That the advisers of the act of absolute power, executed 31 May last, have engaged the king in a breach of the most essential and sacred law of their kingdom."

“ *Que le chancelier dit, que le parole du dit*
 “ *seigneur roy sera toujours aussi inviolable*
 “ *que sacrée ; & dans l’instant il fait publier*
 “ *au nom du dit seigneur roi nombre de dispo-*
 “ *sitions qui sont des infractions manifestes*
 “ *des engagements les plus authentiquement*
 “ *contractio, des paroles les plus solennelle-*
 “ *ment données par le dit seigneur roi.*”
 “ That the chancellor said, the king’s
 “ word should always be equally sacred and
 “ inviolable ; and in the very instant he
 “ causes a number of regulations to be pub-
 “ lished in the king’s name, which are ma-
 “ nifest infractions of engagements the most
 “ formally taken, and of promises the most
 “ solemnly given by his majesty.” — I could
 produce many more instances, but I give
 these in their own proper words, to shew that
 even in France the greatest freedom is used
 in remonstrating on public measures, and
 that it is allowed there to treat the acts done,
 and edicts published *in the king’s own name*,
 as the acts of his ministers. Nor do I hear
 that a single member of the parliament of
 Paris was sent to the Bastille for this li-
 berty.

This language was indeed strong : how
 would it sound in the ears of our dismissing
 ministers ? It was strong, but it was ex-
 cited by that which justifies the strongest

language, by a repetition of the hardest oppressions, and was the voice of liberty driven almost to despair.

The other parliaments of the kingdom caught the same fire, they breathed the same spirit. The duke de Fitzjames and the duke de Richelieu indeed, two properly instructed, *properly dependent* military governors, went into the parliament houses at Toulouse and Bourdeaux; the duke de Harcourt did the same at Rouën; they erased resolutions and acts of those parliaments, and registered the royal edicts (pronounced illegal) in their place. It is well for the arbitrary system of the French government they have a *civilized*, souple noblesse, and a staunch, devoted army, else might that free spirit which even now gains ground amongst them soon break their chains, and restore them to the ancient liberty they once enjoyed. For they too *were once free*! had no arbitrary imprisonments, no *lettres de cachet* *, but liberty for their persons, security for their properties, trials by their peers, juries and efficient, independent parliaments: till the

* Vide Boulainvilliers sur l'Ancient Gouvernement de la France.

Also Matth. Paris.

"Nullus in regno Francorum debet ab aliquo jure spoliaris nisi per judicium 12. Parium."

courtly ambition of the great, and the tame submission of the lower orders of the state, reduced them to that condition of slavery which all their modern annals so fully describe.

But I now return to our author, and will reason a little, coolly, with him on some points not uninteresting to those we jointly address ourselves to, viz. on the general notion of military and parliamentary dependence, the danger of a standing army, and the reasons on which "the long opposition to it was grounded in the breasts of *those firm patriots* he mentions," and whom (as far as they were *firm* to their principles) I shall agree with him to hold in the highest admiration. He will excuse me if I don't extend it to those who have now found so much better reasons for not opposing standing armies at all, and for acting on principles diametrically opposite.

The author then, to bring this matter to an issue, asks the following question :

"What think you was the intent of that annual opposition to standing armies, the managers of which are handed down to us, *some of them* remembered by us as the firmest patriots? &c." When we reflect who some of those *firm patriots* were, it is with pleasure I look at the author's inaccuracy

racy in speaking of them as persons *banded down*, and no longer existing; he fortunately mistakes.

They are many of them still living, for the happiness of this nation, still amongst us, and still exercising their talents, though *in a different way*, for their country's service. Among whom, it is to their honour I mention them, are the duke of B——d, the earl of S——ch, the earl of H——x, the earl of E——t, the earl of M——t, the present Ch——r of the Exch——r, and many more of less distinction, all steady opposers of standing armies *when it was proper to be so*. I wish I could do justice to their arguments; but I am sure I should not, if I said they at all agreed with the little analysis the author fancies he gives of them; where speaking of the ground of their opposition to standing armies, he says: "What was it but in its
 " consequences annulling the idea now en-
 " deavoured to be set up, that officers hold
 " their commissions by another tenure than
 " that of the grace of the crown, and the
 " establishment of parliament?"

It certainly was an hundred other things; and certainly was not *that*, the former part of it at least. It never did, it never could enter into the heads of those, or any patriots, to reason against standing armies from a fear
 that

that they should grow *too independent of the crown*. But from the contrary apprehension, that an army *totally dependent upon the crown* was dangerous to the liberties of the people; that history told us, all the several nations of the world who had lost their liberties, whether in ancient or modern times, had lost them by means of *dependent armies*; and that the power derived to the crown and to its ministers by the disposal of commissions, was a great means of increasing that danger; particularly in the corrupt use they might make of it by influencing members of parliament in their votes. Such were the principles on which standing armies were opposed.

And when *two* officers of distinction had been broke, as supposed, for parliamentary conduct, some of those same patriots expressed their abhorrence of, and their apprehensions from such a practice, in terms much stronger than I could find for the purpose; both in the course of several debates in parliament on that subject, and in protests subscribed with their names.

I will put the author in mind of some sentences now on record applicable to every part of this subject.

Viz. On the 13th of February, 1733, the then duke of Marlborough presented to the house a bill for *securing the constitution*, by preventing

venting officers of the land forces, &c. from being *deprived of their commissions*, otherwise than by judgment of a court-martial.—This was a pretty strong measure, yet at that time not thought too strong for the occasion by some of those *firm patriots*.

The author and the public will judge by the title of the bill as above, and by a few of the arguments for it, which I shall mention presently, whether the fear of *too much independence* in officers was the object of that measure! The bill was rejected, and a protest formed, and now standing on the Journals, in which are the following paragraphs.

Dissentient.

~~Because—~~

“ As various events may happen to oblige
 “ future parliaments to pursue the same mea-
 “ sures (of keeping up standing armies) which
 “ nothing but the utmost necessity can justi-
 “ fy, they being repugnant to the nature
 “ of our constitution, and dangerous to the
 “ liberties of a free people; and as the
 “ whole disposition of the said forces is abso-
 “ lutely in the crown, we cannot but think
 “ it highly reasonable, when so great an
 “ increase of power and influence comes to be
 “ annually vested in, and constantly exercised
 “ by the crown, that some such limitations
 “ as proposed by this bill are not only
 “ proper,

" proper, but necessary; and we are con-
 " firmed in that opinion by the doctrine
 " so often, and so strongly laid down in
 " this house, *that the greatest danger to*
 " *this nation from a standing military force,*
 " must arise from the abuse of the power
 " which now subsists of cashiering officers
 " without any crime proved or alledged, and
 " of garbling the army at pleasure.

" Because the practice of all the nations
 " in Europe, even where the government
 " is most arbitrary, justifies the intention
 " of this bill; for no instance can be pro-
 " duced in any other kingdom or state
 " (as we believe) where officers are cashiered
 " or deprived of their commissions, other-
 " wise than by the judgment of a court-
 " martial: how much stronger reason then
 " have we of this nation to establish such a
 " rule, since many of our officers are in a
 " capacity of having a share in the legisla-
 " ture, *where it is absolutely necessary for the*
 " *preservation of the constitution that every*
 " *member should be free and independent!*"

" The power of conferring grace and fa-
 " vour would have remained entire had this
 " bill pass; and only the disagreeable part of
 " inflicting punishment was designed to be
 " limited; or rather secured from being
 " turned to any ill use *by the private whispers*

" of some malicious or vindictive minister, who
 " may at any time hereafter get possession of
 " the royal ear."

Sure the framers of this protest were prophets as well as patriots! It was signed, among many others, by the present duke of B—f—d and earl of M—chm—t. Such was the sense then of those opposers of standing armies, and the only common sense applicable to the subject. I could quote volumes to the same effect; for the opposition was annual, as the author says; the genius of its managers was not unfruitful, and the debates of parliament are full of such arguments.—How therefore could our poor author so awkwardly stumble upon this unfortunate topic of *quondam opposition*? For is it not a gross affront to his patrons to put into their mouths what is flatly contradicted by the public records of the times; and thus revive the memory of those variations in their conduct, which it was his, as it is their business, to bury in eternal oblivion?

Since however the author has been thus unreserved in putting such contradictory nonsense in the mouths of those he defends, it can scarcely be taken amiss that he uses the same freedom with those he opposes; else how void of candour or of sense must the declaration above quoted appear, viz. "That

“ an idea is now set up, that officers hold
 “ their commissions by another tenure than
 “ that of the grace of the crown, and the
 “ establishment of parliament !”

By whom has such an idea been set up ?
 Where ? In what words ? At what time ?
 If not from the grace of the crown, from
 whom then are officers to hope for commis-
 sions or advancement ? They are the un-
 doubted, hitherto undisputed, right of the
 crown ; nor has one argument I have heard
 on this occasion had the least tendency to de-
 stroy it.

The other part, viz. *the independence of the
 army on the establishment of parliament*, is so
 wide from all pretence to the smallest foun-
 dation, one is ashamed to reason upon it.—
 Several officers of service and distinction have
 been dismissed for not concurring constantly
 with the min——rs in parliament ; this is
 complained of as an abuse of power and in-
 fluence in the min——rs.

Therefore, says the author, “ an idea is
 “ set up, that officers are not to hold their
 “ commissions from the establishment of
 “ parliament :” which is as much a conclu-
 sion from the premises as if he had said,
Ergo, officers are no longer to be dressed in
 scarlet, or to wear swords ; it is a conclusion
 totally unconnected with the proposition.—

How do officers *bald their commissions from the establishment of parl*——? Certainly by the parliament's voting the number of troops to be kept up, and providing for their maintenance. If therefore the parliament are still to vote the number, and still to provide for the maintenance of the army, even annually, and not a tittle is said in objection to that power, how is an idea set up of any independence of officers on parliament, or the establishment of parliament? But in truth those gentlemen have conceived such an horror at the very name of *independence* of any sort, that they start at shadows and phantoms of it in their own scared imaginations.

Suppose therefore the very strongest thing ever thought of on this subject, which is what was proposed by some of the present adm——n as I have shewn, viz. that no officer was to be broke but by the sentence of a court-martial, or at least some crime alledged and proved against him; does it follow, that therefore the parliament cannot reduce a regiment, or ten regiments? If they do not allot them pay, do they not reduce themselves of course? Or does he really think, that a provision so satisfactory to the army would make them rebellious, or render them less grateful to the hand from whence

whence they received both that and all other advantages, while they continued to stand precisely in the same relation they did before to the parliament? Once again, how does the conclusion in any degree follow the premises? Do regiments refuse to be broke or to submit to regulations in other states, where the arbitrary dismissal of officers is not practised? I never heard it.

Compare now this purely imaginary, this childish, visionary fear of the army's becoming independent, because min——al oppression is complained of; and because we have not yet bowed the head so low as to lick the dust off the foot that tramples on us. Compare this with the real, well-grounded constitutional apprehension, of an army *too dependent*; an army enslaved, and enslaving at once the object and tools of oppression. That it is so now, God forbid I should insinuate; I think the reverse; I think them free, as they are brave; but it is to keep them so I argue; for if officers can be taught, through hopes or fears, to abandon one of the first duties of a citizen, by giving up the interest of their country in parl——t, will they not be easily prevailed upon to act the same part in every other situation? And from an army thus mercenary and thoroughly dependent in civil matters on the will either of

k—gs

kings or ministers, have we not the utmost to dread? May we not see them accompany messengers of state to drag the subject out of his bed at midnight; or be the instruments of every tyrannical act of some future arbitrary administration?

It was said of King James, that instead of being a terror to his enemies, he contented himself with the humble province of being a terror to the good people of England; may it not with equal propriety be said hereafter of an army so disciplined, as to become the oppressors of that liberty it was their duty to defend? I again repeat, this evil is I hope at a great distance; but I say the doctrines now inculcated tend to the establishment of it; it is therefore our duty to oppose it in every stage of its progression, if we mean to be a free people.

I think the army free, I think the country so at present; but I see those seeds of decay in our constitution, which, if neglected, may grow up and spoil the harvest, after all the labours so long and nobly borne to prepare it.

All the writers, all the reasoners on the British government, who pretend to any degree of knowledge or impartiality, agree, that the great work of the Revolution, which gave a new life to the liberties of this country

try, and fixed them on a footing of solidity beyond what the freest ages of our ancestors could boast, did not yet provide for their perpetuity by sufficient barriers against that evil, which began to shew itself conspicuously in the immediately preceding reigns; which many circumstances have since contributed to increase, which has been rankling and spreading like a foul canker in every part of our frame; and if not checked by the most wise and steady endeavours of men sincerely dedicated to their country's service, will soon or late infallibly bring on the dissolution of this fair structure, the work of ages, and the nearest approach to perfection of any human establishment from the beginning of time. It is plain I mean that corruption which has too generally diffused itself through all orders of men, though not all in the same degree; and which too many symptoms shew has spread its poison even in the vital parts of this constitution. The beauty as well as strength of this government certainly depend upon the proper balance of power in the royal and popular scales: if the former is totally annihilated, it becomes a republic; if the latter, an absolute monarchy.—If a king governs this country without parliaments, it is an arbitrary government; and it is equally so, if he governs with parliaments

liaments subservient to the will of the crown.

How easily are we misled by names? If a minister and his creatures were to advise the governing without parliaments, would the nation bear but the very idea of it? Yet when they avowedly attempt to corrupt and enslave them, and openly maintain it as a proper measure of government, with what ease do we submit to it?

An officer is told, "Sir, vote with us, and you may expect any favour; vote against us, and you shall be cashiered:—if you expect the support of government, you should give them your assistance; if not, and you oppose them, but in one single measure, retaliation will take place, and we'll ruin you."—These are not vain menaces; they are followed by effects; four officers in a single session are cashiered; more are threatened: it is to spread still wider, and to act collaterally on others by a *Hamlet*, or fear of starving. Known fidelity and attachment to the crown; acknowledged bravery, long services, private character, nothing avails; nothing stands in the way of this hard sentence.

Is this influencing parliaments? It is the way to awe, to corrupt, to enslave them; if not, will any body tell me a more direct
and

and effectual one? Is this a matter of any concern then to the public, or is it not? Take the parliament list, see the long rubric of places, civil and military; and see whether the public is concerned!

Think that the whole revenue of the crown in Charles the Second's time was 1,200,000 l. in James the Second's a little above two millions; I mean the whole raised on the public.—The civil list alone is now 800,000 l. and not less than ten millions are annually raised on the people.

Think then of this immense increase of revenue; of the command of the Treasury; the legion of revenue officers; the managements of the great monied men and monied companies; the lucrative commissions, bargains, jobs, pensions, &c. &c. and then judge if a professed system of employing the thus increased weight of the crown to the purposes of parliamentary influence is alarming to public liberty! I say from the moment such a system prevails,

Actum est de pulcherrimo Imperio!

It is ridiculous to talk of liberties and constitution, they are no more: if the parliament ever becomes enslaved or corrupted, so as to be subservient to the will of a min——r, it

is no longer a parliament, it is no more the representative of the people than the min——r himself is, by whose orders they act : it is he that makes laws ; it is he that raises taxes ; our liberties and properties are his, and at his sole disposal ; nor is England a whit freer in effect than France or Muscovy.

F I N I S.

